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Eider-Orley: The Affirmative Duty of Federal Departments and Agencies to Resto

THE AFFIRMATIVE DUTY OF FEDERAL
DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES TO RESTORE
ENDANGERED AND THREATENED SPECIES
Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act of 19731 (the Act)
imposes an affirmative duty upon all federal departments and agencies to carry out conservation measures designed to restore endangered 2 and threatened 3 species of fish, wildlife, and plants4 to
their former viability. The section provides:
The Secretary [of the Interior or of Commerce] shall review
other programs administered by him and utilize such programs
in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter. All other Federal
departments and agencies shall, in consultation with and with the
assistance of the Secretary, utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter by carrying out programs
for the conservation of endangered species and threatened
species listed pursuant to section 1533 of this title and by taking
such action necessary to insure that actions authorized, funded,
or carried out by them do not jeopardize the continued existence
of such endangered species and threatened species or result in
the destruction or modification of habitat of such species which is
determined by the Secretary, after consultation as appropriate
5
with the affected States, to be critical.
As administrative and judicial implementation of this relatively new
law progresses, the role of federal agencies in restoring endangered
and threatened species will be clarified and broadened.
1. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (Supp. V 1975), as amended by Act of July 12, 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-359, 90 Stat. 911.
2. The term "endangered species" means any species which is in danger
of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range other than
a species of the Class Insecta determined by the Secretary [of the Interior]
to constitute a pest whose protection under the provisions of this chapter
would present an overwhelming and overriding risk to man.
16 U.S.C. § 1532(4) (Supp. V 1975), as amended by Act of July 12, 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-359, 90 Stat. 911.
3. "The term 'threatened species' means any species which is likely to become
an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant
portion of its range." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15) (Supp. V 1975), as amended by Act of July
12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-359, 90 Stat. 911.
4. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(11) (Supp. V 1975), as amended by Act of July 12, 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-359, 90 Stat. 911.
5. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (Supp. V 1975) (originally enacted as Endangered Species
Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 7, 87 Stat. 884).
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The purpose of the Act is to rescue endangered and threatened

species from near-extinction and nurse them back to a point at
which they are no longer endangered or threatened. As the Supreme Court has recently stated, "[tihe plain intent of Congress in
enacting this statute was to halt and reverse the trend toward species
extinction, whatever the cost." 6 To accomplish this, federal agencies
must focus increasingly on positive restoration efforts, in addition
to mere preventive means of avoiding harm to endangered species.
Such preventive measures typically involve voluntary consultation
with the Department of the Interior before finalizing plans for
projects that may affect endangered species. On several occasions,
however, preventive injunctions have been judicially imposed as a
result of citizens' suits authorized by the Act. 7 With the requirement of administrative consultation on all federal actions that may
adversely affect endangered species now firmly established, and a
6.

TVA v. Hill, 46 U.S.L.W. 4673, 4681 (U.S. June 13, 1978) (emphasis added).

7. See TVA v. Hill, 46 U.S.L.W. 4673 (U.S. June 13, 1978); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1976); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976); Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 428 F.
Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1977). The citizen suit provision, section 11(g), provides in part:
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection [detailing procedural requirements] any person may commence a civil suit on his own
behalf(A) to enjoin any person, including the United States and any other
governmental instrumentality or agency ...who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this chapter or regulation issued under the authority thereof; or
(B) to compel the Secretary [of the Interior or of Commerce] to apply... the prohibitions set forth in or authorized pursuant to ...this title with respect to the taking of any resident endangered species or threatened species within any State.
16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (Supp. V 1975), as amended by Act of July 12, 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-359, 90 Stat. 911. "Taking" is defined broadly in the Act. Under § 3, "'take'
means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to
attempt to engage in any such conduct." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(14) (Supp. V 1975), as
amended by Act of July 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-359, 90 Stat. 911.
That § 11(g) has been invoked only infrequently testifies to the success of the
§ 7 consultation provision. The consultation provision is intended "to insure that the
expertise of the appropriate agencies is brought to bear on environmental questions,
and provides for a check against potential biases of mission-oriented agencies." Endangered Species Act Oversight, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Resource Protection of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
97 (1977) (statement of Robert L. Herbst, Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Fish
and Wildlife and Parks). As of January 1978, the Fish and Wildlife Service had
handled more than 4500 § 7 consultations. Telephone interview with Robert Jacobsen, Chief, Branch of Management Operations, Office of Endangered Species, U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior (Jan. 12, 1978). See also ENDANGERED SPECIES TECH. BULL., November 1977, at 1.
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foundation for judicial review of contested actions beginning to
take shape, amelioration of the endangered species' plight is a real
possibility. This note deals with the next step in increasing the

population of endangered species: the cooperation among federal
agencies necessary to implement active restoration.
RESTORATION AND CRITICAL HABITAT

A review of the legislative history of the Act8 and of several of
its provisions indicates a congressional emphasis on restoration.
The purposes of the Act are set out in section 2:
The purposes of this chapter are to provide a means
whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and
threatened species depend may be conserved, [and] to provide a
program for the conservation of such endangered species and
threatened species ....
It is further declared to be the policy of Congress that all
Federal departments and agencies shall seek to conserve endangered species and threatened species and shall utilize their
authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter. 9
The terms "conserve," "conserving," and "conservation" as used in
the Act have a special meaning. They do not signify mere preservation. Rather, they are defined in section 3:
The terms "conserve," "conserving," and "conservation'"
mean to use and the use of all methods and procedures which
are necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened
species to the point at which the measures provided pursuant to
this chapter are no longer necessary. Such methods and procedures include, but are not limited to, all activities associated
with scientific resources management such as research, census,
law enforcement, habitat acquisition and maintenance, propagation, live trapping, and transplantation ....10
In this sense, conservation involves increasing the population of an
endangered or threatened species rather than merely perpetuating
8. See, e.g., 119 CONG. REc. 25,668 (1973) (remarks of Senator Tunney): "The

challenge before us now is to protect these species and their vital habitat and to
restore their numbers to optimum levels."; id. at 25,670 (remarks of Senator Tunney):
"We have a duty to restore what we have endangered-for ourselves and for pos-

terity." See generally H.R. REP.No. 740, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1973).
9. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b)-(c) (Supp. V 1975).
10. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(2) (Supp. V 1975), as amended by Act of July 12, 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-359, 90 Stat. 911.
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a species in its endangered or threatened status. Conservation thus
becomes synonymous with restoration, a term which embodies the
purposes of the Act."
In anticipation of successful restoration, Congress empowered
the Secretary of the Interior in section 4 to review the status of an
endangered species and to change its status to "threatened" when
sufficiently recovered. 12 This review process has been characterized
as enabling
the secretary to provide a "halfway house" for those animals
which have been restored to the point that they are no longer
"threatened with extinction," but have not yet responded to the
point at which they are ready to be completely removed from
the protective umbrella . . . .This procedure can be likened to
that of a hospital where the patient is transferred from the intensive care unit to the general ward until he is ready to be dis3
charged.'
For example, the successful restoration of the greenback cutthroat
trout by federal and state agencies has led to the proposed change
14
of the fish's protection category from endangered to threatened.
The American alligator was recently reclassified in a similar fashion
since it "is making encouraging gains in population over much of its
known historical range . . . . "15 The "threatened" classification is
also used to protect species which have not yet become endangered.16 As of May 31, 1978, there were 175 endangered species of
fish and wildlife in the United States, and only twenty-eight
11. "[T]he basic purpose of the act is to get species off the list, not on the list."
Endangered Species Act Oversight, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Resource Protection of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 64 (1977) (statement of Robert L. Herbst, Assistant Secretary of the Interior for
Fish and Wildlife and Parks).
12. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a) (Supp. V 1975), as amended by Act of July 12, 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-359, 90 Stat. 911. In determining whether a species is endangered or
threatened, the Secretary of the Interior must consider the following factors: "(1) the
present or threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment of its habitat or range;
(2) overutilization for commercial, sporting, scientific, or educational purposes; (3)
disease or predation; (4) the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; (5) other
natural or manmade factors affecting its continued existence." Id.
13. Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1972 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Environment of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
69 (1972) (testimony of Nathaniel P. Reed, Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife
and Parks).
14. ENDANGERED SPECIES TECH. BULL., October 1977, at 1.
15. 42 Fed. Reg. 2071-72 (1977).
16. Id. at 2965 (discussion of Southern Sea otter, determined by U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service to be threatened, rather than endangered).
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threatened domestic species.' 7 Of the twenty-eight threatened
18
species, five had been reclassified from endangered.
Availability of critical habitat 19 is a primary factor in the rehabilitation of a species. 20 The relationship between restoration and
critical habitat has been aptly characterized by a representative of
Defenders of Wildlife, a conservation organization which later became a successful plaintiff in litigation involving the Act:2 '
[The Act's] underlying goal was not only to insure survival, but
to insure to the extent possible, the restoration, I repeat, restoration, of endangered and threatened species to a point where

they are no longer endangered and threatened ....
The Fish and Wildlife Service currently seems to be view-

ing critical habitat as that last ditch area in which the last five to
ten animals of any species will survive. However, critical habitat
relates back to the basic assumptions of the Act-to the goal of
restoration .... Congress, in my view and in the view of many,

did not intend that all endangered and threatened species would
in fact be endangered or threatened forever, nor did they envision critical habitat as being that habitat of postage stamp size
17. ENDANGERED SPECIES TECH. BULL., June 1978, at 12.
18. Telephone interview with Ronald M. Nowak, Staff Biologist, Office of Endangered Species, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior (August 2, 1978).
19. "Critical habitat" was defined recently by the Departments of Commerce
and of the Interior as
any air, land, or water area (exclusive of those existing man-made structures
or settlements which are not necessary to the survival and recovery of a
listed species) and constituent elements thereof, the loss of which would
appreciably decrease the likelihood of the survival and recovery of a listed
species and may include additional areas for reasonable population expansion.
43 Fed. Reg. 874-75 (1978) (to be codified in 50 C.F.R. § 402.02).
20. The importance of protecting habitat was a major theme in the legislative
history of the Act. The following remarks are typical: "[If we are really going to
protect endangered species, there are two things the world has to do: stop the destruction of habitat, and beef up enforcement." Hearings on Endangered Species Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of
the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 225
(1973) (remarks of Nathaniel P. Reed, Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and
Parks, Department of the Interior); "[I]t is ultimately immaterial whether or not an
animal is deliberately molested if its habitat is not preserved. Habitat acquisition
must be a major goal in this legislation." Id. at 301 (remarks of Tom Garrett, Wildlife
Director, Friends of the Earth); "Man can threaten the existence of species of plants
and animals in any of a number of ways . .

.

. The most significant of those has

proven also to be the most difficult to control: the destruction of critical habitat."
H.R. REP. No. 412, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1973) (report of the House Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries).
21. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 428 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1977).
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necessary to continue the survival of the last handful of any
species. The fact is that habitat necessary for survival and restoration must be considered critical until the agencies which are
fostering and promoting development can prove that such habitat
is not critical and necessary for the survival, welfare and subsequent restoration of the species. Without this, the whole
meaning of section 7 . . . and the meaning of the Endangered

Species Act of 1973 will be in jeopardy. The alternative presupposes an ever-expanding list of endangered and threatened
22
species with virtually no chance for restoration.
In fact, the litigation arising from section 7 has centered on
the issue of critical habitat. In Sierra Club v. Froehlke,2 3 an Eighth
Circuit case involving the endangered Indiana bat, the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers planned to construct a dam which would cause
the flooding of certain caves housing the Indiana bat. The court
refused to enjoin construction, finding that section 7 required only
consultation and not acquiescence between the corps and the Department of the Interior, ' 4 and that proper consultation had indeed
occurred. The court then sanctioned a balancing approach between
the expected benefits of the project and "the importance of an unspoiled environment." 2 5 According to the figures used by the
court, only 207 of a total 700,000 bats faced certain doom from the
expected flooding; 2 6 therefore, the habitat involved was found not
27
to be critical for the bat's survival.
Critical habitat of the endangered Mississippi sandhill crane
was the subject of litigation in National Wildlife Federationv. Coleman.2 8 In that case, federally funded highway construction through
22. To Amend the Endangered Species Act of 1973, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Environment of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
105-06 (1976) (statement of Dr. John Grandy, IV).
23. 534 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1976).
24. Id. at 1303. Accord, Hill v. TVA, 549 F.2d 1064, 1070 (6th Cir. 1977), aff'd,
46 U.S.L.W. 4673 (U.S. June 13, 1978); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d
359, 371 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976).
25. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289, 1305 (8th Cir. 1976).
26. Id. at 1303.
27. See id. The entire project was later abandoned for economic and environmental reasons. Endangered Species Act Oversight, Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Resource Protection of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1977) (statement by Charles Warren, Chairman, Council on
Environmental Quality).
28. 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976). In this case, unlike the bat case, the Fish and Wildlife Service, pursuant to § 4(f) of the Act, 16
U.S.C. 1533(f)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1975), as amended by Act of July 12, 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-359, 90 Stat. 911, which empowers the Secretary of the Interior to make emer-
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the sandhill crane's habitat was halted by the Fifth Circuit "until
the Secretary of the Department of Interior determines that the
necessary modifications are made in the highway project to insure
that it will no longer jeopardize the continued existence of the Mississippi Sandhill Crane or destroy or modify critical habitat of the
Mississippi Sandhill Crane." 29 In a forward-looking attempt at
compelling specific remedial restoration, the National Wildlife
Federation asked the court to order acquisition of certain lands by
the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) to mitigate the loss
of critical habitat that would result from the highway construetion. 30 The court declined to decide whether the FHWA could be
so ordered, leaving resolution of the issue of land acquisition to the
Secretaries of the Interior and of Transportation. 3 1 Almost two
years later, administrative settlement of this issue was still pending. 32 Although the highway itself was allowed to progress, conbeen delayed pending
struction of a controversial interchange has
33
dispute.
acquisition
land
the
of
settlement
gency rulings, issued an emergency determination of the crane's critical habitat. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 367 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
979 (1976).
29. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 375 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976).
30. Id. at 361. According to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the concept of
mitigation is inappropriate in resolving conflicts between agency action, such as
highway construction, and the well-being of an endangered species, since mitigation
implies that some degree of harm is acceptable under the Act, provided that compensatory steps are taken, whereas potential harm must be avoided altogether. The
anticipated harm to the crane's critical habitat was not expected to arise directly from
the highway construction, but rather from the private development that would accompany one interchange. The National Wildlife Federation actually sought the acquisition of land surrounding the interchange to avoid harming the crane, not to
mitigate harm to it. Telephone interview with Robert Jacobsen, Chief, Branch of
Management Operations, Office of Endangered Species, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (Jan. 12, 1978). See ENDANGERED SPECIES TECH. BULL., September 1977, at 2.
31. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 375 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976).
32. The Department of Transportation questioned its authority
to implement and pay for mitigation measures, such as purchasing a refuge.
The basic concern [was] that the farther such a refuge gets away from the
site of the project itself, the more difficulty [the Department has] of justifying it under existing transportation legislation. But again, [the Department
was] going to try to interpret [its] existing transportation legislation in a
manner to achieve just as many of those mitigation measures as [it felt] justifiable under that legislation.
EndangeredSpecies Act Oversight, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Resource Protection of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 370 (1977).
33. Telephone interview with Robert Jacobsen, Chief, Branch of Management
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In TVA v. Hill,34 the Supreme Court affirmed a decision of the
Sixth Circuit 3 5 enjoining the TVA from completing the Tellico Dam
and impounding a section of the Little Tennessee River, which has
been designated critical habitat of the snail darter, 36 an endangered
fish. The snail darter requires clean, clear flowing river water with
extensive shoals and clean gravel bottom. 37 Impoundment would
transform the river into a reservoir, destroying the required habitat.
The TVA has admitted:
Most biologists aware of the situation now agree that, although the snail darter spawns in the Little Tennessee River, its
young probably drift downstream through the sluice gates of the
Tellico Dam into the Watts Bar Reservoir where they mature.
With Tellico Dam already in place blocking upstream movement
of fish, the snail darter population above the dam is sharply diminishing; and it is widely agreed that within its legal critical
habitat, the snail darter will die out. 38
The injunction will remain in effect until Congress exempts Tellico
from the Act, the snail darter is deleted from the endangered
species list, or the snail darter's critical habitat is materially redefined by the Fish and Wildlife Service. 39 Despite the expenditure
of millions of dollars of public funds, 40 the Supreme Court rejected
the balancing approach, 4 ' which the Eighth Circuit followed in the
Indiana bat case. 42 The Court found it "beyond doubt that ConOperations, Office of Endangered Species, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Depart-

ment of the Interior (Jan. 12, 1978).
34.

46 U.S.L.W. 4673 (U.S. June 13, 1978).

35. Hill v. TVA, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 46 U.S.L.W. 4673 (U.S.
June 13, 1978).
36. 41 Fed. Reg. 13926-28 (1976) (to be codified in 50 C.F.R. § 17.81).
37. Endangered Species Act Oversight, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Resource Protection of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 212 (1977) (statement of Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Professor, Wayne State
University Law School).
38. TVA, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES PROBLEM, A DISCUSSION 9 (1977).
39. See Hill v. TVA, 549 F.2d 1064, 1075 (6th Cir. 1977), affd, 46 U.S.L.W.
4673 (U.S. June 13, 1978).
40. See TVA v. Hill, 46 U.S.L.W. 4673, 4678 (U.S. June 13, 1978).
41. [Tlhe plain language of the Act, buttressed by its legislative history,
shows clearly that Congress viewed the value of endangered species as "incalculable." Quite obviously, it would be difficult for a court to balance the
loss of a sum certain-even $100 million-against a congressionally declared
"incalculable" value, even assuming we had the power to engage in such a
weighing process, which we emphatically do not.
TVA v. Hill, 46 U.S.L.W. 4673, 4682 (U.S. June 13, 1978).
42. See Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1976).
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gress intended endangered species to be afforded the highest of
43
priorities."
SECTION 7
The cases involving critical habitat have arisen under section
7,44 a subject of varying judicial interpretation. Although the legis-

lative history on the duties of federal agencies is scant,4 5 section 7
has been a primary topic of scholarly commentary on the Act.4 6
43.

TVA v. Hill, 46 U.S.L.W. 4673, 4679 (U.S. June 13, 1978).

44. See text accompanying note 7 supra. In 1975, an official of the Fish and
Wildlife Service appraised the potential effect of § 7 as follows:
It is quite apparent that section 7 is one of the most difficult and potentially
delicate parts of the act, because of the implications of listing critical
habitats. ... [W]ith a proper array of critical habitat designations across the
map of the United States, we could seriously impede, if not halt, many activities carried on either by the Federal Government or under Federal sponsorship in some fashion.
Endangered Species Oversight: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and
Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House Comm. on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 259 (1975) (remarks of Lynn A. Greenwalt, Director of U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior).
45. The Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, for
example, omits mention of § 7 altogether. H.R. REP. No. 740, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 26
(1973), reprinted in [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3001, 3005. In 1973, in
one of the few references to federal agencies and § 7, Senator Marlow Cook of Kentucky expressed frustration over his inability to prevent the Army Corps of Engineers
from building a road "right smack through the nesting areas of wild turkeys." He was
assured by Douglas Wheeler, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Fish, Wildlife, and
Parks "that [the counterpart in S. 1592, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REc.
12, 411 (1973), to current § 7] for the first time would prohibit another Federal
agency from taking action which does jeopardize the status of endangered species."
Endangered Species Act of 1973: Hearings BeJbre the Subcomm. on Environment of
the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1973). Another such reference is found in the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries Report on the
Endangered and Threatened Species Conservation Act of 1973:
Under the authority of this paragraph, for example, the Director of the Park
Service would be required to conform the practices of his agency to the
need for protecting the rapidly dwindling stock of grizzly bears within Yellowstone Park. These bears, which may be endangered, and are undeniably
threatened, should at least be protected by supplying them with carcasses
from excess elk within the park, by curtailing the destruction of habitat by
clearcutting National Forests surrounding the Park, and by preventing hunting until their numbers have recovered sufficiently to withstand these pressures.
H.R. REP. No. 412, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 14 (1973). A plausible explanation for this
gap in the legislative history is that proponents of § 7, recognizing its enormous
potential for controversy, intentionally understated the possible extent of federal
agency obligations.
46. See, e.g., Wood, Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973: A Significant Restriction for All Federal Activities, 5 ENVT'L L. REP. 50,189 (1975); Note,
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Yet, in the cases and other discussion, the affirmative duties imposed by this section have either been overlooked, 4 7 touched on
49
briefly, 48 or discounted as unfeasible.
Enforcement of section 7 has only gradually gained momentum. In 1975, a spokesman for the Fish and Wildlife Service, which
administers much of the Act, admitted: "[I]n all candor, we have
only recently begun to implement section 7, not because I do not
consider it to be important, but because there were many other
things that had to be done first." 50 In 1976, Senator Wendell Ford
commented: "Since the act was effective upon its date of enactment, the Departments [of Commerce and of the Interior] had essentially no lead time to gear up for these new responsibilities, and
the implementation of the act has not occurred as rapidly as some
would like." 5 1
Remedial Restoration
Despite this slow start, implementation of section 7 is now
well underway. The Fish and Wildlife Service anticipates 10,000 to
20,000 consultations by other federal agencies during fiscal 1978 on
how to avoid adverse impact on endangered and threatened
species. 52 Despite the many section 7 consultations successfully
National Wildlife Fed'n v. Coleman: Endangered Species and Highway Planning,9
TRANSP. L.J. 221 (1977); Note, Obligations of FederalAgencies Under Section 7 of
the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1247 (1976); Annot., 7 ENVT'L
L. REP. 10,049 (1977); Annot., 6 ENVT'L L. REP. 10,120 (1976). For a general discussion of the Act, see M. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 386

(1977); Coggins, Conserving Wildlife Resources: An Overview of the Endangered
Species Act of 1973, 51 N.D.L. REV. 315 (1974); 5 ENVT'L L. 29 (1974). For a comparison of the 1973 Act with three prior acts, see 4 ENVT'L AFF.255 (1975).
47. See, e.g., M. BEAN, supra note 46, at 405 n.121.
48. For a discussion of § 7's effects on the U.S. Forest Service and the Bureau of
Land Management, see Coggins, supra note 46, at 329 & n.118 and accompanying
text; 5 Envt'l L. 29, 55-61 (1974).
49. See Note, Obligations of Federal Agencies Under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, supra note 45, at 1253 n.48.
50. EndangeredSpecies Oversight: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries
and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House Comm. on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 259 (1975) (remarks of Keith Schreiner,
Associate Director, Federal Assistance, Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of the
Interior). The official who offered these remarks was the subject of an article by Jack
Anderson and Les Whitten in the Washington Post, March 15, 1975, reprinted in
Endangered Species Oversight, supra, at 325. The article suggested that implementation of the Act was obstructed by bureaucratic submission to the hunting lobby.
51. To Amend the Endangered Species Act of 1973: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Environment of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1976) (statement of Senator Wendell Ford).
52. Endangered Species Oversight: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Resource
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handled by the Service, 5 3 it is inevitable that some harm to endangered species will be inflicted prior to administrative or judicial
review, as, for example, when an endangered species is discovered
in the area of a project already begun. When actions "authorized,
funded, or carried out"54 by a federal agency jeopardize the existence of endangered or threatened species, that agency has violated
section 7 of the Act and is subject to its sanctions. Since the purpose of the Act is restoration, the agency should then undertake
remedial restoration to counteract its infractions. This restoration
can be undertaken either voluntarily or under court order.
Although litigation involving the Indiana bat, the sandhill
crane, and the snail darter arose under section 7, the relief sought
in those cases was primarily preventive, rather than restorative. In
the first two cases, judicial intervention was requested prior to execution of the contested agency action. The courts were asked to enjoin the projects in question before harm was inflicted. The issue of
taking affirmative steps to restore was reached only tangentially,
since the relief sought was limited to the immediate issue of restraining construction.
In the bat case, 55 which sheds little light on the affirmative
duty to restore, the Eighth Circuit did take note of the Army
Corps of Engineers' plans to prevent harm to the bats from activities associated with construction of the dam.5 6 The issue of affirmative action was raised by the National Wildlife Federation in the
crane case 5 7 when it asked the court to compel FHWA acquisition
of habitat. 5 8 In that situation, habitat acquisition was seen by the
National Wildlife Federation as a sine qua non for proceeding with
the highway construction rather than as a remedy for damage already done. Nevertheless, habitat acquisition is a good example of
one effective way that a federal agency can accomplish restoration
of species adversely affected by its activities.
Protection of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 98 (1977) (statement of Robert L. Herbst, Assistant Secretary of the Interior for
Fish and Wildlife and Parks).
53. See note 7 supra.
54. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (Supp. V 1975).
55. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1976).
56. The Army Corps of Engineers submitted reports to the court indicating an
awareness of the problems presented and discussing the feasibility of installing protective devices to keep explorers out of the caves. Id. at 1296 n.22.
57. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 979 (1976).
58. Id. at 375.
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In the case of the snail darter, however, much of the harm had
been inflicted before suit was brought. 59 Even so, plaintiffs in that
case limited their request for relief to a permanent injunction preventing closure of the dam. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, which granted the injunction, found sufficient basis in the
"'causal nexus" between closure of the dam and depletion of the
snail darter population to trigger the affirmative action requirement
6
of section 7. 0
The Supreme Court apparently agreed that granting the requested injunctive relief satisfied the section 7 requirement to insure against jeopardizing endangered or threatened species.6 1 It is
nevertheless arguable that halting closure constitutes only partial
section 7 action necessary to insure against harm. At best, halting
closure might insure against further harm. 62 A more comprehensive
remedy in this case would have been mandatory injunctive relief
compelling removal or modification of the dam6 3 as the only
adequate means of eliminating interference with the breeding patterns of the snail darter. 64 This would begin to insure that executed
agency action will no longer jeopardize the endangered fish or its
critical habitat.
No-Fault Restoration
In addition to requiring remedial restoration by federal agencies, section 7 requires that
59. TVA v. Hill, 46 U.S.L.W. 4673 (U.S. June 13, 1978). See text accompanying note 38 supra.

60. Hill v. TVA, 549 F.2d 1064, 1070 (6th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 46 U.S.L.W. 4673
(U.S. June 13, 1978).
61. TVA v. Hill, 46 U.S.L.W. 4673 (U.S. June 13, 1978).
62. Grave harm had already resulted. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
63. Such relief has traditionally been granted in cases of lesser magnitude. See,
e.g., Allen v. Stowell, 145 Cal. 666, 79 P. 371 (1905) (mandatory injunction to remove
dam which was diverting water onto and injuring neighboring land). Cf. City of
Dunsmuir v. Silva, 154 Cal. App. 2d 825, 317 P.2d 653 (1957) (mandatory injunction
to remove building interfering with plaintiff's easement for travel); Morton v. Oregon
Short Line Ry., 48 Or. 444, 87 P. 151 (1906) (mandatory injunction ordering removal
ofjetty).
64. In the court of appeals decision, Judge Celebrezze wrote: "Our responsibility under § 1540(g)(1)(A) is merely to preserve the status quo where endangered
species are threatened, thereby guaranteeing the legislative or executive branches
[sic] sufficient opportunity to grapple with the alternatives." Hill v. TVA, 549 F.2d
1064, 1071 (6th Cir. 1977), affd, 46 U.S.L.W. 4673 (U.S. June 13, 1978). Judge
Celebrezze incorrectly characterized the court's responsibility as mere preservation
of the status quo of endangere-1 species. See, e.g., authorities cited notes 8-11 supra
and accompanying text.
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[t]he Secretary [of the Interior or of Commerce] . . . review
other programs administered by him and utilize such programs
in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter [and that] [a]ll
other Federal departments and agencies . . . utilize their au-

thorities in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter by carrying out programs for the conservation of endangered species and
threatened species .... 65
Affirmative conservation programs, unlike remedial restoration,
need not be linked to culpability or specific conflict between
agency action and conservation. No-fault restoration involves ongoing programs, rather than ad hoc measures, and is most conveniently carried out by land management agencies. The legislative
history indicates that this section was primarily directed toward
land management agencies. 66 Litigation arising under section 7 has
involved such agencies as the Army Corps of Engineers, 6 7 the
Federal Highway Administration, 68 the TVA, 6 9 and the Fish and
70
Wildlife Service.
In Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus,71 a citizens' suit was
brought to compel the Fish and Wildlife Service to fulfill its section
7 duty to utilize its programs in furtherance of conservation. Seeking declaratory judgment, Defenders of Wildlife challenged an administrative decision of the Service permitting sport hunting of migratory game birds from one half hour before sunrise until sunset.
Plaintiffs maintained that the regulation violated the Act since protected endangered species could not readily be distinguished from
game species in the low visibility before sunrise. 72 The administrative record on which the challenged regulation was based contained
65.

16 U.S.C. § 1536 (Supp. V 1975).

66. "We have lots of land management agencies who [sic] could provide for the
protection of endangered species habitat at the same time they carry out their pri-

mary mission." Hearings on Endangered Species Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries
and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House Comm. on Merchant

Marine and Fisheries, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 213 (1973) (remarks of Douglas Wheeler,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks). "Our bill . .. would
have the Navy... take on a very large responsibility as a land managing agency to
protect any endangered species on that piece of land and on any other land they
manage." Id. at 215 (remarks of Nathaniel P. Reed, Assistant Secretary for Fish and

Wildlife and Parks).
67. See Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1976).

68. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976).
69. See TVA v. Hill, 46 U.S.L.W. 4673 (U.S. June 13, 1978).
70. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 428 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1977).
71. 428 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1977).
72. Id. at 168-69.
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no studies of the effect of such shooting on protected species. 73
Taking a stand apparently at odds with its role as champion of endangered and threatened species, the Service argued that it was
required neither to carry out any such studies nor to provide a more
complete administrative record.71 Its position was "that the Endangered Species Act only requires that the regulations 'do not
jeopardize the continued existence of these [protected] species.' "75
Judge Gesell rejected this argument, citing language from various sections of the Act, including section 7.76 He concluded:
It is clear from the face of the statute that the Fish and Wildlife
Service, as part of Interior, must do far more than merely avoid
the elimination of protected species. It must bring these species
back from the brink so that they may be removed from the protected class, and it must use all methods necessary to do so.
Under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, the agency has
an affirmative duty to increase the population of protected
77
species.
He then issued a declaratory judgment that the regulations for the
1976-1977 hunting season were arbitrary and unlawful, and directed the Service to conduct current rulemaking proceedings ac78
cording to its statutory obligations.
In so holding, Judge Gesell interpreted that part of section 7
which requires the Department of the Interior to utilize its programs "in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter."7 9 Section 7
further requires all other federal departments and agencies to
utilize their authority similarly "in furtherance of the purposes of
this chapter." 8 0 This opinion therefore gave notice that all federal
73. Id. at 169.
74. Id.
75. Id. (brackets in original).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 170.
78. Id. Following this decision, the Fish and Wildlife Service established a § 7
administrative record, by forming and consulting with an ad hoc committee of endangered species specialists. They concluded that migratory bird hunting would not
jeopardize whooping cranes and Mexican ducks within the meaning of § 7, but that
the regulations did not meet the Act's requirements of active conservation since it
was indeed possible that some members of endangered species might be killed.
Telephone interview with a member of the Office of the Solicitor, Department of the
Interior (Jan. 13, 1978) (interviewee's name withheld by request).
79. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (Supp. V 1975).
80. Id.
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departments and agencies must affirmatively address the problem
of restoration.
One way in which federal agencies can carry out conservation
programs, as well as remedial restoration, within the meaning of
section 7, is through acquisition of land that can be designated and
preserved as habitat of endangered and threatened species.8 1 Although the Secretary of the Interior was given authority to acquire
land under section 5,82 lack of funds has hampered full implementation of the Act. 83 In 1976, Keith Schreiner, Endangered Species
Program Manager, wrote:
A hard fact about helping Endangered species to recover is
that it is expensive-particularly the acquisition of habitat ....
The initial purchase cost is only one concern in deciding
what lands to acquire within our budget. We also have to consider the long-term costs....
Accordingly, where it is both legally permissible and agreeable to all concerned, we try to enter into arrangements
whereby other Federal agencies and individual states can share
84
or assume the management costs.

Since restoration of endangered and threatened species requires biologic expertise, affirmative conservation programs may be
undertaken by federal agencies in cooperation with recovery
teams85 organized by the Department of the Interior. In the case
of remedial restoration, if the federal agency does not have the
81. Under 23 U.S.C. § 107 (1970), for example, the Secretary of Transportation
may acquire land required by a state for "right-of-way or other purposes," if the state
so requests. See also the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. § 662(c),
663(c) (1970), which authorizes federal agencies constructing or operating water control projects to acquire lands and make provision for such land to be used for conservation.
82. 16 U.S.C. § 1534 (Supp. V 1975).
83. See To Amend the Endangered Species Act of 1973: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Environment of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
16 (1976) (remarks of George W. Milias, Deputy Director, Fish and Wildlife Service).
The entire text of this hearing is of general interest on financing enforcement of the
Act.
84. ENDANGERED SPECIES TECH. BULL., October 1976, at 1.
85. Recovery teams, composed of experts nominated by the Fish and Wildlife
Service and representing federal, state and private sectors, identify actions necessary
to restore a species based on the present status of the species, the need for coordinating activity by all agencies already involved in recovery work, the availability of
funds, and the need for land acquisition to protect the species' habitat. Endangered
Species Oversight: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Resource Protection of the
Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 96 (1977).
See also ENDANGERED SPECIES TECH. BULL., August 1976, at 2.
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requisite expertise, the cost of recovery efforts accomplished
through the Office of Endangered Species could be assessed against
the culpable agency.
INJUNCTIVE REMEDIES

The need for restoring endangered and threatened species is
such that courts must fashion injunctive remedies for violations of
the Act, since the civil or criminal sanctions 86 provided in the Act
are inadequate remedies for rehabilitating dwindling species. The
statutory authority for fashioning injunctive remedies is found in
section 11(g), the citizen suit provision. 87 This section should be liberally construed since section 3 provides that conservation "methods and procedures include, but are not limited to," various enumerated resource management activities. 88
Explicit statutory description of injunctive remedies is not a
requirement for such judicial relief. The Supreme Court held in
United States v. Republic Steel Corp.8 9 that under the Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1899,90 appropriate injunctive remedies may be
fashioned and that "detailed codes which provide for every contingency" are unnecessary. 91 The Court upheld an injunction
against the discharge of industrial waste solids into a river by the
defendants' iron mills even though the statute provided explicitly
for the removal of structures only.92 The Court further stated:
"Congress has legislated and made its purpose clear; it has provided enough federal law in § 10 from which appropriate remedies
may be fashioned even though they rest on inferences. Otherwise
we impute to Congress a futility inconsistent with the great design
86. Section 11 provides civil penalties which vary from not more than $1000 to
not more than $10,000, depending upon whether the violation was knowingly or unknowingly committed, and whether the violation involved an endangered species or
a threatened species. Willful criminal violations involve fines and imprisonment
which vary similarly according to whether the species involved is endangered or
threatened. 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (Supp. V 1975), as amended by Act of July 12, 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-359, 90 Stat. 911.
87. See note 7 supra.
88. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(2) (Supp. V 1975), as amended by Act of July 12, 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-359, 90 Stat. 911 (emphasis added).
89. 362 U.S. 482 (1960).
90. 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-426i (1970) (originally enacted as Act of March 3, 1899, ch.
425, 30 Stat. 1121). The statute was designed to prevent interference with the
navigability of United States waters by bridges, dams, or other obstructions except by
express permission of the United States. See id.
91. United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 492 (1960).
92. Id. at 491.
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of this legislation. " 93
The Court followed the same reasoning in Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United States, 94 a Government suit against the
owner of a sunken barge to recover the costs of removal. 95 The
Court expressed its disbelief "that Congress intended to withhold
from the Government a remedy that ensures the full effectiveness
96
of the Act."
The jurisdiction of federal district courts to issue mandatory
injunctions has been upheld in a group of cases decided by the
Fifth and Ninth Circuits involving restoration under the Rivers and
Harbors Act. 97 In an unrelated case, the Fifth Circuit reversed that
part of a district court decision which refused to order restoration
by a municipality of the condition of natural drainage on a landowner's property which was adversely affected by the city's pumping of water into an adjacent catchment area. 98 The appellate court
held that the landowner must be given a proper opportunity to
submit evidence supporting his claim for mandatory injunctive relief.9 9 The tool of mandatory injunctions can thus be effectively
used in environmental litigation even without a statutory basis for
it. Under section 11 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973,100 as
under section 12 of the Rivers and Harbors Act, 1 1 there is a
93.

Id. at 492.

94. 389 U.S. 191 (1967).
95. Id. at 193. A consolidated case, United States v. Cargill, Inc., in which the
Government asked that parties responsible for the sinking of a vessel be declared
responsible for its removal, was also decided in the Government's favor. Id. at 194.
96. Id. at 204.
97. See, e.g., United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 478 F.2d 418 (5th Cir.
1973) (remanded to district court for administrative proceedings to determine
whether injunction to restore topography affected by illegal dredging should be issued): "[W~e have no doubt that the issuance of a mandatory injunction requiring
extensive restoration operations at very large expense to the developers is entirely
within the Court's power as expressly mandated by the statute." Id. at 430-31. See
also Weiszmann v. District Eng'r, U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 526 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir.
1976) (remanded to district court for further proceedings to determine whether injunction to undo effects of illegal dredging should be issued); United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 526 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1976) (remanded to district court for
further proceedings to determine whether injunction to fill canals illegally constructed should be issued); United States v. Sunset Cove, Inc., 514 F.2d 1089 (9th
Cir. 1975) (required modification of injunction to restore shoreline which was illegally filled and elevated).
98. Fox v. City of West Palm Beach, 383 F.2d 189, 194-95 (5th Cir. 1967). For
cases in which state courts have mandated restoration, see cases cited note 63 supra.
99. Fox v. City of West Palm Beach, 383 F.2d 189, 194-95 (5th Cir. 1967).
100. See note 7 supra.
101. "[T]he removal of any structures or parts of structures erected in violation
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statutory basis for such relief, and mandatory injunctions can be
important remedies of unique effectiveness.
CONCLUSION

Although the Endangered Species Act of 1973 is administered
by the Department of the Interior, the potential for other federal
agencies and departments to aid in restoration should not be overlooked. Not only does the Department of the Interior have an everincreasing workload, but it has conflicting responsibilities. Critics
have charged, for example, that involvement in "energy production,
mineral leasing, and the exploitation of nonliving resources" is incompatible with protection of endangered species. 10 2 The active
involvement of other agencies is not only desirable but necessary.
In Defenders of Wildlife, Judge Gesell criticized the rulemaking procedures of the Fish and Wildlife Service itself, finding that
insufficient consideration had been given to restoration.' 0 3 Although his admonitions were directed to the Service itself, the
policy involved is equally applicable to other agencies: The Endangered Species Act of 1973 imposes an affirmative duty on all
federal departments and agencies to increase the population of pro04
tected species. Although litigation involving section 7 has dealt primarily with
its precautionary aspects, and has not squarely raised the issue of
restoration, the courts have in varying degree acknowledged the
affirmative obligations of federal agencies. As industrialization and
general development proceed, and environmentalists take increasof the provisions of the said sections may be enforced by the injunction of any
district court exercising jurisdiction in any district where such structures may exist
." 33 U.S.C. § 406 (1970).
102. To Amend the Endangered Species Act of 197& Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Environment of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 57
(1976) (remarks of Anne Wickham, Assistant Wildlife/Conservation Director, Friends
of the Earth). See also id. at 107 (statement of Dr. John W. Grandy, IV, Executive
Vice President, Defenders of Wildlife) (noting the "amazing coincidence" that the
proposed boundary of the critical habitat for the California Condor was contiguous
with the boundary of a pending phosphate lease under the control of the Bureau of
Land Management). The Department of Commerce, which also has a statutory role in
administering the Act, has likewise been criticized for failure to comply properly
with the Act. Endangered Species Oversight: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House Comm. on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 107 (1975) (statement of Lewis
Regenstein, Executive Vice President, The Fund for Animals).
103. Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 428 F. Supp. 167, 170 (D.D.C. 1977).
104. Id.
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ing advantage of the Act's citizen suit provision, litigation involving
federal agencies and restoration is certain. To enforce federal
agency restoration of endangered species as envisioned in the Act,
the courts must be prepared to fashion injunctive remedies when
necessary. The citizen suit provision of the Act provides for such
injunctive relief, and it is this remedy which is of potentially major
importance in redressing violations of the Act.
Martha T. Eider-Orley
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